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Abstract
Adversarial attacks often involve random perturbations of the inputs drawn from
uniform or Gaussian distributions, e.g. to initialize optimization-based white-
box attacks or generate update directions in black-box attacks. These simple
perturbations, however, could be suboptimal as they are agnostic to the model
being attacked. To improve the efficiency of these attacks, we propose Output
Diversified Sampling (ODS), a novel sampling strategy that attempts to maximize
diversity in the target model’s outputs among the generated samples. While ODS is
a gradient-based strategy, the diversity offered by ODS is transferable and can be
helpful for both white-box and black-box attacks via surrogate models. Empirically,
we demonstrate that ODS significantly improves the performance of existing white-
box and black-box attacks. In particular, ODS reduces the number of queries
needed for state-of-the-art black-box attacks on ImageNet by a factor of two.
1 Introduction
Deep neural networks have achieved great success in image classification. However, it is known
that they are vulnerable to adversarial examples [1] — small perturbations imperceptible to humans
that cause classifiers to output wrong predictions. Several studies have focused on improving model
robustness against these malicious perturbations. Examples include adversarial training [2, 3], input
purification using generative models [4, 5], regularization of the training loss [6–9], and certified
defenses [10–12].
Strong attacking methods are crucial for evaluating the robustness of classifiers and defense mecha-
nisms. Many existing adversarial attacks rely on random sampling, i.e., adding small random noise
to the input. In white-box settings, random sampling is widely used for random restarts [13–16] to
find a diverse set of starting points for the attacks. Some black-box attack methods [17, 18] also use
random sampling to explore update directions for finding or improving adversarial examples. In these
attacks, random perturbations are typically sampled from a naïve uniform or Gaussian distribution in
the input pixel space.
Random sampling in the input space, however, may not sufficiently explore the output (logits) space
of a neural network — diversity in the input space does not directly translate to diversity in the output
space of a deep nonlinear model. We illustrate this phenomenon in the left panel of Figure 1. When
we add random perturbations to an image in the input space (see dashed blue arrows in the first plot
of Figure 1), the corresponding output logits could be very similar to the output for the original image
(as illustrated by the second plot of Figure 1). Empirically, we observe that this phenomenon can
negatively impact the performance of attack methods.
To overcome this issue, we propose a sampling strategy designed to obtain samples that are diverse in
the output space. Our idea is to perturb an input away from the original one as measured directly by
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Figure 1: Illustration of the differences between random sampling (blue dashed arrows) and ODS
(red solid arrows). In each figure, the black ‘o’ corresponds to an original image, and white ‘o’s
represent sampled perturbations. (Left): white-box setting. Perturbations by ODS in the input space
are crafted by maximizing the distance in the output space. (Right): black-box setting. Outputs on a
target model correspond to perturbations crafted on a surrogate model.
distances in the output space (see solid red arrows in the second plot in Figure 1). First, we randomly
specify a direction in the output space. Next, we perform gradient-based optimization to generate a
perturbation in the input space that yields a large change in the specified direction. We call this new
sampling technique Output Diversified Sampling (ODS).
ODS can improve adversarial attacks under both white-box and black-box settings. For white-box
attacks, we exploit ODS to initialize the optimization procedure of finding adversarial examples
(called ODI). ODI typically provides much more diverse (and effective) starting points for adversarial
attacks. Moreover, this initialization strategy is agnostic to the underlying attack method, and can be
incorporated into most optimization-based white-box attack methods. Empirically, we demonstrate
that ODI improves the performance of `∞ and `2 attacks compared to naïve initialization methods. In
particular, the PGD attack with ODI outperforms the state-of-the-art MultiTargeted attack [16] against
pre-trained defense models, while its computational complexity is 50 times smaller on CIFAR-10.
In black-box settings, we cannot directly apply ODS because we cannot access gradients of the
target model. As an alternative, we apply ODS to surrogate models and observe that the resulting
samples are diverse with respect to the target model: diversity in the output space transfers (see the
rightmost plot in Figure 1). Empirically, we demonstrate that ODS can reduce the number of queries
needed for a score-based attack (SimBA [18]) by a factor of two on ImageNet, and also achieve better
query-efficiency than the state-of-the-art Square Attack [19]. In addition, ODS with a decision-based
attack (Boundary Attack [17]) reduces the median perturbation distances of adversarial examples by
a factor of three compared to the state-of-the-art HopSkipJump [20] and Sign-OPT [21] attacks.
2 Preliminaries
We denote an image classifier as f : x ∈ [0, 1]D 7→ z ∈ RC , where x is an input image, z represents
the logits, and C is the number of classes. We use h(x) = argmaxc=1,...,C fc(x) to denote the
model prediction, where fc(x) is the c-th element of f(x).
Adversarial attacks can be classified into targeted and untargeted attacks. Given an image x, a label
y and a classifier f , the purpose of untargeted attacks is to find an adversarial example xadv that is
similar to x but causes misclassification h(xadv) 6= y. In targeted settings, attackers aim to change
the model prediction h(xadv) to a particular target label t 6= y. The typical goal of adversarial attacks
is to find an adversarial example xadv within B(x) = {x+ δ : ‖δ‖p ≤ }, the -radius ball around
an original image x. Another common setting is to find a valid adversarial example with the smallest
`p distance from the original image.
White-box attacks In white-box settings, attackers can access full information of the target model.
One strong and popular example is the Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) attack [2], which iteratively
applies the following update rule:
xadvk+1 = ProjB(x)
(
xadvk + η sign
(
∇xadvk L(f(x
adv
k ), y)
))
(1)
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where ProjB(x)(x
adv) , argminx′∈B(x) ||xadv − x′||p, η is the step size, and L(f(x), y) is a loss
function, e.g. the margin loss defined as maxi 6=y fi(x)− fy(x). To increase the odds of success, the
procedure is restarted multiple times with uniformly sampled initial inputs from B(x).
Black-box attacks In black-box settings, the attacker can only obtain outputs of the target model.
Black-box attacks can be largely classified into three categories: transfer-based, score-based, and
decision-based. Transfer-based attacks craft adversarial examples using surrogate models which
approximate the target model, and transfer them to the target model. The surrogate models are
typically obtained by training with similar dataset to that used for training the target model. In
score-based settings, attackers can know the output scores (logits) of the classifier. On the other
hand, in decision-based settings, attackers only can access the output labels of the classifier. For the
latter two approaches, attacks are evaluated in terms of query efficiency, i.e. the number of queries to
generate an adversarial example and its perturbation size.
Recently, several studies [22–25] exploited surrogate models to estimate the gradients of the loss
function of the target model. Some attack methods used random sampling in the input space, such as
the decision-based Boundary Attack [17] and the score-based Simple Black-box Attack [18].
3 Output Diversified Sampling
As intuitively presented in Figure 1, random sampling in the input space does not necessarily produce
samples with high diversity measured in the output space. To address this problem, we propose Output
Diversified Sampling (ODS). Given an image x, a classifier f and the direction of diversification
wd ∈ RC , we define the normalized perturbation vector of ODS as follows:
vODS(x, f, wd) = ∇xwᵀdf(x)/||∇xwᵀdf(x)||, (2)
where wd is sampled from the uniform distribution over [−1, 1]C . Below we show how to enhance
white- and black-box attacks with ODS.
3.1 Initialization with ODS for white-box attacks
In white-box settings, we utilize ODS for initialization (ODI) to generate output-diversified starting
points. Given an original input xorg and the direction for ODI wd, we try to find the furthest image x
from xorg by maximizing w
ᵀ
d(f(x)− f(xorg)) via the following iterative update:
xk+1 = ProjB(xorg) (xk + ηODI sign(vODS(xk, f, wd))) (3)
where B(xorg) is the set of allowed perturbations, which is typically an -ball in `p norm, and ηODI
is a step size. When applying ODI to `2 attacks, we omit the sign function. After some steps of ODI,
we start an attack from the image obtained by ODI. We sample a new direction wd for each restart
in order to obtain diversified starting points for the attacks. We provide the pseudo-code for ODI in
Algorithm 2 of the Appendix.
One sampling step of ODI costs roughly the same time as one iteration of most gradient-based attacks
(e.g., PGD). Empirically, we observe that the number of ODI steps NODI = 2 is already sufficient
to obtain diversified starting points (details of the sensitivity analysis are in the Appendix), and fix
NODI = 2 in all our experiments unless otherwise specified. We emphasize that ODS is not limited
to PGD, and can be applied to a wide family of optimization-based adversarial attacks.
Experimental verification of increased diversity: We quantitatively evaluate the diversity of start-
ing points in terms of pairwise distances of output values f(x), confirming the intuition presented in
the left figures of Figure 1. We take a robust model on CIFAR-10 as an example of target models, and
generate starting points by ODI and uniform initialization to calculate the mean pairwise distance.
Then, the obtained pairwise distance (i.e. diversity) from ODI is 6.41, which is about 15 times larger
than that from uniform initialization (0.38). Details are provided in Section C.1 of the Appendix.
3.2 Sampling update directions with ODS for black-box attacks
In black-box settings, we exploit ODS to sample update directions instead of random sampling. Given
a target classifier f , we cannot calculate ODS perturbation vODS(x, f, wd) because we are not able
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Algorithm 1 Simple Black-box Attack [18] with sampling update direction by ODS
1: Input: A targeted image x, loss function L, a target classifier f , a set of surrogate models G
2: Output: attack result xadv
3: Set the starting point xadv = x
4: while xadv is not adversary do
5: Choose a surrogate model g from G, and sample wd ∼ U(−1, 1)C
6: Set q = vODS(xadv, g, wd)
7: for α ∈ {,−} do
8: if L(xadv + α · q) > L(xadv) then
9: Set xadv = xadv + α · q and break
to calculate gradients on the target model f . To approximate the diversity of the target model, we
introduce a surrogate model g and calculate ODS vector vODS(x, g, wd).
In this paper, we combine ODS with two black-box attacks: decision-based Boundary Attack [17] and
score-based Simple Black-box Attack (SimBA [18]). As an example, we provide the pseudo-code of
SimBA with ODS in Algorithm 1. In the original paper [18], the authors picked an update direction
q randomly from orthonormal candidates Q. We replace it to ODS, as shown in the line 5 and 6 of
Algorithm 1. For other attacks, we replace sampling of the attacks in the same way.
In Algorithm 1, we prepare a set of multiple surrogate models and choose a surrogate model per
sampling because we empirically found multiple surrogate models make attacks stronger. We choose
each model with equal probability in this paper.
Experimental Verification of Increased Diversity: We quantitatively evaluate that ODS yields
large changes in the output space of the target model, as shown in the right figures of Figure 1. As the
target and surrogate models, we use pre-trained Resnet50 [26] and VGG19 [27] model on ImageNet,
respectively. We calculate and compare the mean pairwise distances among samples by ODS and
random Gaussian sampling. Then, the obtained pairwise distance (i.e. diversity) by ODS is 0.79,
which is 10 times larger than Gaussian sampling (0.07). Details are in Section D.1 of the Appendix.
We also note that ODS does not produce diversified samples when we use random networks as
surrogate models, i.e. learned features of images on surrogate models are crucial to transfer diversity.
4 Experiments in white-box settings
In this section, we show that the diversity offered by ODI can improve white-box `∞ and `2 attacks.
Moreover, we demonstrate that a simple combination of PGD and ODI achieves new state-of-the-art
attack success rates. All experiments are held in untargeted settings.
4.1 Efficacy of ODI for white-box attacks
We combine ODI with two popular attacks: `∞ PGD attack [2] and `2 C&W attack [28]. We compare
the performance of the attacks with ODI against those with naïve initialization.
Setup We perform attacks against three pre-trained models on MNIST, CIFAR-10 and ImageNet,
which are adversarially trained with `∞ PGD attack. For MNIST and CIFAR-10, we use models
from MadryLab1 [2]. For ImageNet, we use the Feature Denoising ResNet152 network2 [29].
For PGD attacks, we evaluate the model accuracy with 20 restarts. C&W attacks are evaluated by
calculating the minimum `2 perturbation that yields a valid adversarial example among 10 restarts for
each image, and measuring the average of the minimum perturbations.
We sample starting points within `∞ -ball and use a uniform distribution for naïve initialization for
PGD attacks. For C&W attacks, the original paper [28] did not apply initialization. Here, we sample
1https://github.com/MadryLab/mnist_challenge and https://github.com/MadryLab/
cifar10_challenge. We use their secret model.
2https://github.com/facebookresearch/ImageNet-Adversarial-Training.
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starting points within `2 -ball, and adopt a Gaussian distribution for naïve initialization because it is
natural for `2 sampling. We describe details of settings for each attack in the Appendix.
Table 1: Model performance under attacks with ODI. The values are model accuracy (lower is better)
for PGD and the average of the minimum `2 perturbations (lower is better) for C&W. All results are
the average of three trials.
PGD C&W
model naïve ODI naïve ODI
MNIST 90.31± 0.02% 90.12± 0.04% 2.27± 0.00 2.25± 0.01
CIFAR-10 46.06± 0.02% 44.35± 0.03% 0.71± 0.00 0.67± 0.00
ImageNet 43.5± 0.0% 42.3± 0.0% 1.58± 0.00 1.32± 0.01
Results We summarize all quantitative results in Table 1. Attack performances with ODI are better
than naïve initialization for all models and attacks. The improvement by ODI on the CIFAR-10
and ImageNet models is more significant than that of the MNIST model. We hypothesize that this
difference results from the difference in model non-linearity. When the non-linearity of a target model
is strong, the difference in diversity between the input and output space could be large, in which case
ODI will be more effective in providing a diverse set of restarts to facilitate attack algorithms.
4.2 Comparison between PGD attack with ODI and state-of-the-art attacks
To further demonstrate the power of ODI, we perform PGD attack with ODI (called ODI-PGD)
against MadryLab’s robust models [2] on MNIST and CIFAR-10, introduced in the previous section,
and compare ODI-OGD with state-of-the-art attacks.
Setup One state-of-the-art attack we compare with is the well-tuned PGD attack [16], which
achieved 88.21% accuracy for the robust MNIST model. The other attack we focus on is the
MultiTargeted attack [16], which obtained 44.03% accuracy against the robust CIFAR-10 model.
We use all test images on each dataset and perform ODI-PGD under two different settings. One is the
same as Section 4.1. The other is ODI-PGD with tuned hyperparameters, e.g. increasing the number
of steps and restarts. Please see the Appendix for more details of tuning.
Results We summarize the comparison between ODI-PGD and state-of-the-art attacks in Table 2.
Our tuned ODI-PGD reduces the accuracy to 88.12% for the MNIST model, and to 44.00% for the
CIFAR-10 model. These results outperform existing state-of-the-art attacks.
To compare their runtime, we use the total number of steps (the number of steps multiplied by the
number of restarts) as measure of complexity, because the computation time per step is comparable
for all gradient-based attacks. In Table 2, the computational cost of tuned ODI-PGD is smaller than
that of state-of-the-art attacks, and especially 50 times smaller on the CIFAR-10 model. Surprisingly,
ODI-PGD with normal complexity on the first column can even outperform the tuned PGD [16] with
high complexity on CIFAR-10. These results indicate the efficiency of ODI.
Table 2: Comparison of ODI-PGD with state-of-the-art attacks against pre-trained defense models.
The complexity rows display products of the number of steps and restarts. Results for ODI-PGD are
the average of three trials. For ODI-PGD, the number of steps is the sum of ODS and PGD steps.
model ODI-PGD(in Sec. 4.1)
tuned
ODI-PGD
tuned PGD
[16]
MultiTargeted
[16]
MNIST accuracy 90.12± 0.04% 88.12± 0.02% 88.21% 88.36%complexity 42× 20 1050× 1000 1000× 1800 1000× 1800
CIFAR-10 accuracy 44.35± 0.03% 44.00± 0.01% 44.51% 44.03%complexity 22× 20 160× 20 1000× 180 1000× 180
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5 Experiments in black-box settings
In this section, we demonstrate that black-box attacks with sampling by ODS significantly reduce the
number of queries needed to generate adversarial examples.
5.1 Query-efficiency of score-based attacks with ODS
To show the efficiency of ODS, we combine ODS with the score-based Simple Black-box Attack
(SimBA) [18]. SimBA randomly samples a vector and either adds or subtracts the vector to the target
image. The vector is sampled from pre-defined orthonormal vectors in the input space, which are the
discrete cosine transform (DCT) basis vectors in the original paper [18]. We replace the DCT basis
with sampling by ODS (called SimBA-ODS), as shown in Algorithm 1.
Setup We randomly sample 300 images from ImageNet validation set which are correctly classified.
We use pre-trained ResNet50 model as the target model. As surrogate models for ODS, we select
four pre-trained models (VGG19, ResNet34, DenseNet121 [30], MobileNetV2 [31]).
We run untargeted and targeted attacks. For targeted attacks, we uniformly sample target labels. We
set the same hyperparameters for SimBA as the original paper: step size is 0.2 and the number of
iteration is 10000 for untargeted attacks and 30000 for targeted attacks. As the loss function for
SimBA, we use the margin loss for untargeted attacks and the cross-entropy loss for targeted attacks.
Results First, we make a comparison between SimBA-DCT [18] and SimBA-ODS. Table 3 com-
pares the number of queries and the median `2 perturbations. SimBA-ODS remarkably reduces the
average queries by a factor ranging between 2 and 3 compared to SimBA-DCT in both untargeted
and targeted settings. This confirms that ODS diversity not only is helpful in white-box attacks, but
also leads to significant query-efficiencies in black-box settings. Surprisingly, SimBA-ODS also
decreases the average perturbations roughly by a factor of two. Namely, the diversity afforded by
ODS is also helpful to find natural adversarial examples.
Next, we compare SimBA-ODS with the Square Attack [19], which is state-of-the-art `∞ and `2
bounded attacks. For comparison, we regard SimBA as `2 bounded attacks: the attack is successful
when adversarial `2 perturbation is less than a given bound . We set  = 5 and other hyperparameters
according to the original paper [19], except the number of iteration which is 20000 for untargeted
and 60000 for targeted attacks.
Table 3: Number of queries and `2 perturbations for score-based attacks.
untargeted targeted
success average median `2 success average median `2
attack rate queries perturbation rate queries perturbation
SimBA-DCT [18] 100.0% 908 2.95 97.0% 7113 7.00
SimBA-ODS 100.0% 241 1.40 98.3% 3502 3.55
Table 4: Number of queries for SimBA-ODS and `2
score-based state-of-the-art attacks with norm bound
 = 5.
untargeted targeted
success average success average
attack rate queries rate queries
SimBA-ODS 99.67% 236 90.3% 2842
Square [19] 99.67% 647 96.7% 11647
Figure 2: Relationship between success
rate and number of queries for targeted
score-based attacks.
In Table 4, SimBA-ODS outperforms the Square Attack in terms of the number of queries in both
untargeted and targeted settings. For targeted attacks, the attack success rate of SimBA-ODS is lower
than the Square Attack because SimBA does not restrict `2-norm of adversarial perturbation. To
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compare the query-efficiency in target settings more precisely, we depict how the attack success rate
increases with the number of queries in Figure 2. The success rate of SimBA-ODS rapidly increases
at small query levels compared to the Square Attack.
5.2 Query-efficiency of decision-based attacks with ODS
We demonstrate that ODS also improves query-efficiency for decision-based attacks. We combine
ODS with the decision-based Boundary Attack [17]. The Boundary Attack starts from an image
which is adversarial, and iteratively updates the image to find smaller perturbations. To generate
the update direction, the authors [17] sampled a random noise vector from a Gaussian distribution
N (0, 1) per step. We replace the sampling from a Gaussian distribution with sampling by ODS
(called Boundary-ODS). We give the pseudo-code of Boundary-ODS in Algorithm 3 of the Appendix.
Setup We use the same settings as the previous section for score-based attacks: 300 validation
images on ImageNet, pre-trained ResNet50 target model, and four pre-trained surrogate models. We
run untargeted and targeted attacks. In targeted settings, we give randomly sampled images with
target labels as initial images. We use the implementation in Foolbox [32] for Boundary Attack with
default parameters, which is more efficient than the original implementation.
We also compare Boundary-ODS with two state-of-the-art decision-based attacks: the HopSkipJump
attack [20] and the Sign-OPT attack [21]. We use the implementation in ART [33] for HopSkipJump
and the author’s implementation for Sign-OPT. We set default hyperparameters for both attacks.
Results Table 5 summarizes median `2 perturbations at fixed queries for each attack. Apparently,
Boundary-ODS significantly improves query-efficiency compared to the original Boundary Attack.
Moreover, Boundary-ODS even outperforms state-of-the-art attacks. The median `2 perturbation
at 10000 queries decreases to less than one-third for untargeted attacks and less than one-fourth for
targeted attacks. We also describe the relationship between median `2 perturbations and the number
of queries in Figure 3. Boundary-ODS outperforms other attacks, especially in targeted settings.
Boundary-ODS only needs less than 3500 queries to achieve the adversarial perturbation obtained by
other attacks at 10000 queries.
Table 5: Median `2 perturbations for Boundary-ODS and decision-based state-of-the-art attacks.
number of queries
untargeted targeted
attack 1000 5000 10000 1000 5000 10000
Boundary [17] 45.07 11.46 4.30 73.94 41.88 27.05
Boundary-ODS 7.57 0.98 0.57 27.24 6.84 3.76
HopSkipJump [20] 14.86 3.50 1.79 65.88 33.98 18.25
Sign-OPT [21] 21.73 3.98 2.01 68.75 36.93 22.43
Untargeted Targeted
Figure 3: Relationship between median `2 perturbations and the number of queries for decision-based
attacks. Error bars show 25%ile and 75%ile of `2 perturbations.
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5.3 Effectiveness of ODS with out-of-distribution images
Although several studies used prior knowledge from surrogate models to improve performance of
black-box attacks, there is a drawback—those approaches require dataset to train surrogate models.
In reality, it is impossible to obtain dataset used for training of the target model. However, ODS
is applicable even if we only have limited out-of-distribution (OOD) training dataset which only
contains images whose labels are different from labels of attacked images and target labels. Under
the condition, most existing methods using prior knowledge would not work, because it is difficult to
approximate gradients of the loss function on the target model. In contrast, ODS does not need to
estimate gradients of the loss function, so it could work with OOD training dataset.
We demonstrate an experiment to confirm the statement. We select 100 classes on ImageNet which
are different from classes of images used in the experiments of Section 5.2. We train surrogate models
using OOD training dataset with the 100 classes. We train five surrogate models with the same
ResNet18 architecture because multiple surrogate models provide diversified directions. Then, we run
Boundary-ODS with the trained surrogate models under the same setting as Section 5.2. In Table 6,
while Boundary-ODS with OOD training dataset underperforms Boundary-ODS with full dataset,
it still significantly outperforms the original Boundary Attack with random sampling. Namely, the
diversity by ODS is helpful to improve black-box attacks even if we only have OOD images.
Table 6: Median `2 perturbations for Boundary-ODS with surrogate models trained with OOD
images.
number of queries
untargeted targeted
attack 1000 5000 10000 1000 5000 10000
Boundary [17] 45.07 11.46 4.30 73.94 41.88 27.05
Boundary-ODS (OOD dataset) 11.27 1.63 0.98 41.67 13.72 8.39
Boundary-ODS (full dataset in Sec. 5.2) 7.57 0.98 0.57 27.24 6.84 3.76
6 Related works
ODS utilizes the output diversity on target models. A related work in the context is the white-box
MultiTargeted attack [16]. The attack changes the target class of attacks per restarts, and it can be
regarded as a method which aims to obtain diversified attack results. However, there are several
differences between MultiTargeted and ODS. First, while MultiTargeted only focuses on `p-bounded
white-box attacks, ODS is developed for general white- and black-box attacks. In addition, since ODS
does not require the original class of target images, ODS gives broader application than MultiTargeted.
Furthermore, because the diversity provided by MultiTargeted is restricted to away from the original
class, ODS can achieve better results for initialization and sampling than MultiTargeted. We give
further discussion in Section E of the Appendix.
ODS utilizes surrogate models, which are commonly used for black-box attacks. Most previous
methods exploit surrogate models to estimate gradients of the target model [34–38, 22–25]. In
contrast, ODS does not approximate gradients of the loss function, but instead focuses on the diversity
of outputs for the target model. As a result, ODS is applicable for out-of-distribution images, as
discussed in Section 5.3.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we propose ODS, a novel sampling strategy for white- and black-box attacks. By gener-
ating more diverse perturbations as measured in the output space, ODS brings more effective starting
points for white-box attacks. Leveraging surrogate models, ODS also improves the exploration of
the output space for black-box attacks. Moreover, ODS for black-box attacks is applicable even if
surrogate models are trained with out-of-distribution dataset from target images, so black-box attacks
with ODS are more practical than other black-box attacks using prior knowledge of surrogate models.
Empirical results demonstrate that ODS with existing attack methods outperforms state-of-the-art
attacks in various white-box and black-box settings.
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While we only focus on ODS with surrogate models trained with labeled dataset, we believe that
ODS works well even if we only have unlabeled dataset. We also suppose that we can improve the
efficiency of ODS by the selection of suitable surrogate models via reinforcement learning. We leave
them as future works.
Broader Impact
The existence of adversarial examples is a major source of concerns for machine learning applications
in the real world. For example, imperceptible perturbations crafted by malicious attackers could
deceive safety critical systems such as autonomous driving and facial recognition systems. Since
adversarial examples exist not only for images, but also for other domains such as text and audio, the
potential impact is large. Our research provides new state-of-the-art black-box adversarial attacks
in terms of query-efficiency and makes adversarial attacks more practical and strong. While all
experiments in this paper are for images, the proposed method could be applicable to other modalities.
Thus, our research could be used in harmful ways by malicious users.
On the positive side, strong attacks are necessary to develop robust machine learning models. For the
last few years, several researchers have proposed adversarial attacks which break previous defense
models. In response to these strong attacks, new and better defense mechanisms have been developed.
It is this feedback loop between attacks and defenses that advances the field. Our research not only
provides a state-of-the-art attack, but also sheds light on a new perspective, the importance of the
diversity, for strong adversarial attacks, so our research could inspire new approaches to robustness.
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A Pseudo-code of proposed methods
In this section, we provide the pseudo-codes of methods proposed in the main paper. First, Algorithm 2
shows the pseudo-code of ODI for white-box attacks in Section 3.1. The line 5-6 in the algorithm
describes the iterative update by ODI.
Algorithm 2 Initialization by ODS (ODI) for white-box attacks
1: Input: A targeted image xorg, a target classifier f , perturbation set B(xorg), number of ODI
steps NODI , step size ηODI , number of restarts NR
2: Output: Starting points {xstarti } for adversarial attacks
3: for i = 1 to NR do
4: Sample x0 from B(xorg), and sample wd ∼ U(−1, 1)C
5: for k = 0 to NODI − 1 do
6: xk+1 ← ProjB(xorg) (xk + ηODI sign(vODS(xk, f, wd)))
7: xstarti ← xNODI
We also describe the algorithm of Boundary-ODS, used in Section 5.2 of the main paper. Algorithm 3
shows pseudo-code of Boundary-ODS. The original Boundary Attack [17] first sampled a random
noise vector q from a Gaussian distribution N (0, 1) and then orthogonalized the vector to keep the
distance from the original image (line 7 in Algorithm 3). After that, the attack refined the vector q to
reduce the distance from the original image such that the following equation holds:
d(x, xadv)− d(x, xadv + q) =  · d(x, xadv) (4)
where d(a, b) is the distance between a and b. We replace the random Gaussian sampling to ODS
as in the line 5 and 6 of Algorithm 3. Sampled vectors by ODS yield large changes for outputs on
the target model and increase the probability that the updated image is adversarial (i.e. the image
satisfies the line 9 of Algorithm 3), so ODS makes the attack efficient.
Algorithm 3 Boundary Attack [17] with sampling update direction by ODS
1: Input: A targeted image x, a label y, a target classifier f , a set of surrogate models G
2: Output: attack result xadv
3: Set the starting point xadv which is adversary
4: while k < number of steps do
5: Choose a surrogate model g from G, sample wd ∼ U(−1, 1)C
6: Set q = vODS(xadv, g, wd)
7: project q onto a sphere around the original image x
8: update q with a small movement toward the original image x such that Equation (4) holds
9: if xadv + q is adversarial then
10: Set xadv = xadv + q
B Details of experiment settings
B.1 Hyperparameters and settings for attacks in Section 4.1
We describe hyperparameters and settings for PGD and C&W attacks in Section 4.1.
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Multiple loss functions L(·) can be used for PGD attacks, including the cross-entropy loss, and the
margin loss defined as maxi6=y fi(x) − fy(x). We use the margin loss for PGD attacks to make
considered attacking methods stronger.
PGD attacks have three hyperparameters: pertubation size , step size η and number of steps N .
We chose  = 0.3, 8/255, 4/255, η = 0.02, 2/255, 0.5/255 and N = 40, 20, 50 for MadryLab
(MNIST), MadryLab (CIFAR-10), ResNet152 Denoise (ImageNet), respectively. We use the whole
test set except for ImageNet, where the first 1000 test images are used.
For C&W attacks, we define naïve random initialization to make sure the starting points are within
an `2 -radius ball: we first sample Gaussian noise w ∼ N(0, 1) and then add the clipped noise
 · w/‖w‖2 to an original image. We set the perturbation radius of initialization  by reference to
attack bounds in other studies:  = 2.0, 1.0, 5.0 for MadryLab (MNIST), MadryLab (CIFAR-10),
ResNet152 Denoise (ImageNet), respectively. we also set hyperparameters of C&W attacks as
follows: max iterations are 1000 (MNIST) and 100 (CIFAR-10 and ImageNet), search step is 10,
learning rate is 0.1, and initial constant is 0.01. The attack is performed for the first 1000 images
(MNIST and CIFAR-10) and the first 500 images (ImageNet).
B.2 Hyperparameter tuning for tuned ODI-PGD in Section 4.2
We describe hyperparameter tuning for our tuned ODI-PGD in Section 4.2. We summarize the setting
in Table 7.
Table 7: Hyperparameter setting for tuned ODI-PGD in Section 4.2.
ODI PGD
model total step
NODI
step size
ηODI
optimizer total step
N
step size (learning rate)
ηk
MNIST 50 0.05 Adam 1000
0.1 (k < 500)
0.01 (500 ≤ k < 750)
0.001 (750 ≤ k)
CIFAR-10 10 8/255 signfunction 150
8/255 (k < 50)
0.8/255 (50 ≤ k < 100)
0.08/255 (100 ≤ k)
For ODI, we increase the number of ODI step NODI to obtain more diversified inputs than ODI
with NODI = 2. In addition, we make step size ηODI smaller than  on MNIST, because -ball with
 = 0.3 is large and ηODI = 0.3 is not suitable for seeking the diversity within the large -ball. In
summary, we set (NODI , ηODI) = (50, 0.05), (10, 8/255) for the MNIST model and the CIFAR-10
model, respectively.
We tune hyperparameters of PGD based on Gowal et al. [16]. While several studies used the sign
function to update images for the PGD attack, some studies [39, 16] reported that updates by Adam
optimizer [40] brought better results than the sign function. Following the previous studies [39, 16],
we consider the sign function as an optimizer and the choice of an optimizer as a hyperparameter. We
use Adam for the PGD attack on the MNIST model and the sign function on the CIFAR-10 model.
We adopt scheduled step size instead of fixed one. Because we empirically found that starting from
large step size brings better results, we set the initial step size η0 as η0 =  for the CIFAR-10 model.
When we use Adam, step size is considered as learning rate.
B.3 Setting for training on ImageNet in Section 5.3
We describe the setting of training of surrogate models on ImageNet in the experiment of Section 5.3.
We use the implementation of training provided in PyTorch with default hyperparameters. Namely,
training epochs are 90 and learning rates are changed depending on epoch: 0.1 until 30 epochs, 0.01
until 60 epochs, 0.001 until 90 epochs. Batch size is 256 and weight decay 0.0001.
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C Additional results and experiments for ODI with white-box attacks
C.1 Diversity offered by ODI
We empirically demonstrate that ODI can find a more diverse set of starting points than random
uniform initialization, as pictorially shown in the left figures of Figure 1 of the main paper.
As an example of target models, we train a robust classification model using adversarial training [2]
on CIFAR-10. We adopted popular hyperparameters for adversarial training under the `∞ PGD attack
on CIFAR-10: perturbation size  = 8/255, step size η = 2/255, and number of steps N = 10.
Training epochs are 100 and learning rates are changed depending on epoch: 0.1 until 75 epochs,
0.01 until 90 epochs, and 0.001 until 100 epochs. Batch size is 128 and weight decay 0.0002.
On the target model, we quantitatively evaluate the diversity of starting points by each initialization
in terms of pairwise distances of output values f(x). Each initialization is bounded within `∞
-ball with  = 8/255. We pick 100 images on CIFAR-10 and run each initialization 10 times to
calculate the mean pairwise distances among outputs for different starting points. As a result, the
mean pairwise distance obtained from ODI is 6.41, which is about 15 times larger than that from
uniform initialization (0.38). This corroborates our intuition that starting points obtained by ODI are
more diverse than uniform initialization.
We also visualize the diversity offered by ODI. First, we focus on loss histogram of starting points
by ODI and naïve uniform initialization. We pick an image from the CIFAR-10 test dataset and run
each initialization 100 times. Then, we calculate loss values for starting points to visualize their
diversity in the output space. The left panel of Figure 4 is the histogram of loss values for each
initialization. We can easily observe that images from naïve initialization concentrate in terms of loss
values (around −1.0), whereas images from ODI are much more diverse in terms of the loss values.
In addition, we apply t-SNE [41] to the output logits for starting points by each initialization. We
visualize the embedding produced by t-SNE in the right panel of Figure 4. As expected, starting
points produced by ODI are more diversified than those by naïve initialization.
Histogram of loss values 2D Embeddings by t-SNE
Figure 4: (Left): Histogram of loss values evaluated at starting points by ODI and naïve uniform
initialization. The loss function is the margin loss. (Right): Embedding for starting points sampled
on each initialization produced by t-SNE.
C.2 Analysis of the sensitivity to hyperparameters of ODI
For ODI, we mainly set the number of ODI steps NODI = 2 and step size ηODI = . To validate the
setting, we confirm that ODI-PGD is not sensitive to these hyperparameters. We attack adversarially
trained models on CIFAR-10 introduced in Section C.1, and adopt the same attack setup for ODI-PGD
on CIFAR-10 as Section 4.1. We test NODI = 2, 4, 8, 16 and ηODI = , /2, /4, /8, but exclude
patterns with NODI · ηODI < 2 to make NODI · ηODI larger than or equal to the diameter of the
-ball. We calculate the mean accuracy for five repetitions of the attack, each with 20 restarts.
Table 8 shows the mean accuracy under ODI-PGD for different hyperparameters. The maximum
difference in the mean accuracy among different hyperparameters of ODI is only 0.05%. Although
large NODI and ηODI will be useful to find more diversified starting points, the performance of
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Table 8: The sensitivity to the number of ODI steps NODI and step size ηODI . We repeat each
experiment 5 times to calculate statistics.
NODI ηODI mean max min
2  44.46% 44.50% 44.45%
4 /2 44.47% 44.50% 44.42%
4  44.42% 44.48% 44.40%
8 /4 44.47% 44.52% 44.44%
8 /2 44.42% 44.48% 44.36%
8  44.46% 44.49% 44.42%
16 /8 44.46% 44.50% 44.43%
16 /4 44.46% 44.50% 44.40%
16 /2 44.45% 44.48% 44.43%
16  44.44% 44.47% 44.41%
ODI is not very sensitive to hyperparameters. Thus, we restrict NODI to a small value to give fair
comparison in terms of computation time as much as possible. Table 8 also shows that the difference
between the maximum and minimum accuracy is about 0.1% for all hyperparameter pairs. This result
supports the stability of ODI.
C.3 Accuracy curve for adversarial attacks with ODI
In Section 4, we experimentally represented that the diversity offered by ODI improved white-box
`∞ and `2 attacks. we describe the accuracy curve with the number of restarts for attacks with ODI
and naïve initialization.
Figure 5 shows how the attack performance improves as the number of restarts increases in the
experiment of Section 4.1. Attacks with ODI outperforms those with naïve initialization with the
increase of restarts in all settings. These curves further corroborate that restarts facilitate the running
of attack algorithms, and ODI restarts are more effective than naïve ones. We note that the first restart
of ODI is sometimes worse than naïve initialization. It is because diversity can cause local optima, i.e.
random directions of ODI are not always useful. With the increase of restarts, at least one direction is
useful and the accuracy drops.
PG
D
C
&
W
MNIST CIFAR-10 ImageNet
Figure 5: The attack performance against number of restarts for attacks with ODI. (Top): the model
accuracy for PGD, (Bottom): the average of minimum `2 perturbations for C&W.
Next, we describe the accuracy curve for the comparison between state-of-the-are attacks and ODI-
PGD in Section 4.2. To emphasize the stability of the improvement, we evaluate the confidence
intervals of our results against MadryLab’s MNIST and CIFAR-10 models. We run tuned ODI-PGD
attack with 3000 restarts on MNIST and 100 restarts on CIFAR-10. Then, we sample 1000 runs on
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MNIST and 20 runs on CIFAR-10 from the results to evaluate the model accuracy, and re-sample
100 times to calculate statistics. Figure 6 shows the accuracy curve under tuned ODI-PGD. We
observe that confidence intervals become tighter as the number of restarts grows, and tuned ODI-PGD
consistently outperforms the state-of-the-art attack after 1000 restarts on MNIST and 20 restarts on
CIFAR-10.
MadryLab (MNIST) MadryLab (CIFAR-10)
Figure 6: Model accuracy under tuned ODI-PGD and the current state-of-the-art attacks [16]. The
solid lines represent values from Table 2 and the error bars show 95% confidence intervals.
C.4 Tighter estimation of robustness for various models
One important application of powerful adversarial attacks is to evaluate and compare different defense
methods. In many previous works on defending against adversarial examples, PGD attack with naïve
uniform initialization (called naïve-PGD) is a prevailing benchmark and its attack success rate is
commonly regarded as a tight estimation on (worst-case) model robustness. In this section, we
conduct a case study on six recently published defense methods [42–47] to show that ODI-PGD
outperforms naïve-PGD in terms of upper bounding the worst model accuracy under all possible
attacks.
Setup We use pre-trained models from four of those studies, and train the other two models [46, 47]
using the settings and architectures described in their original papers. We run attacks with  = 8/255
on all test images. Other attack settings are the same as the experiment for CIFAR-10 in Section 4.1.
Apart from comparing ODI-PGD and naïve-PGD, we also evaluate PGD attack without restarts
(denoted as PGD1) as it is adopted in several existing studies [42–44, 47].
Table 9: Accuracy of models after performing ODI-PGD and naïve-PGD attacks against recently
proposed defense models.
model (1) PGD1 (2) naïve-PGD (3) ODI-PGD (1)−(2) (2)−(3)
UAT [42] 62.63% 61.93% 57.43% 0.70% 4.50%
RST [43] 61.17% 60.77% 59.93% 0.40% 0.84%
Feature-scatter [44] 59.69% 56.49% 39.52% 3.20% 16.97%
Metric learning [45] 50.57% 49.91% 47.64% 0.56% 2.27%
Free [46] 47.19% 46.39% 44.20% 0.80% 2.19%
YOPO [47] 47.70% 47.07% 45.09% 0.63% 1.98%
Results As shown in Table 9, ODI-PGD uniformly outperforms naïve-PGD against all six recently-
proposed defense methods, lowering the estimated model accuracy by 1–17%. In other words,
ODI-PGD provides uniformly tighter upper bounds on the worst case model accuracy than naïve-
PGD. Additionally, The accuracy ranking of the defence methods for ODI-PGD is different from
naïve-PGD and PGD1. These results indicate that ODI-PGD might be a better benchmark for
comparing and evaluating different defense methods, rather than naïve-PGD and PGD1.
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D Additional results and experiments for ODS with black-box attacks
D.1 Diversified samples by ODS
We empirically show that ODS can yield diversified changes in the output space of the target model,
as shown in the right figures of Figure 1 of the main paper. Specifically, we evaluate the mean
pairwise distance among outputs for different perturbations by ODS and compare it with the distance
among outputs for random Gaussian sampling.
We use pre-trained Resnet50 [26] and VGG19 [27] model as the target and surrogate models,
respectively. We pick 100 images on ImageNet validation set and sample perturbations 10 times
by each sampling method. For comparison, we normalize the perturbation to the same size in the
input space. Then, the obtained pairwise distance on the target model by ODS is 0.79, which is 10
times larger than the pairwise distance by random Gaussian sampling (0.07). This indicates that the
diversity by ODS is transferable.
D.2 Success rate curve of score-based attacks
In Section 5.1, we demonstrated that SimBA-ODS outperformed state-of-the-art attacks in terms of
the query-efficiency. As an additional result, we give the success rate curve of score-based attacks
with respect to the number of queries in the experiments. Figure 7 and 8 shows how the success
rate changes with the number of queries for SimBA-ODS and state-of-the-art attacks. SimBA-ODS
especially brings query-efficiency at small query levels in both untargeted and targeted settings.
untargeted targeted
Figure 7: Relationship between success rate and number of queries for score-based SimBA-ODS and
SimBA-DCT.
untargeted targeted
Figure 8: Relationship between success rate and number of queries for score-based SimBA-ODS and
Square Attack. Each attack is evaluated with norm bound  = 5.
D.3 Frequency distribution of `2 perturbation for decision-based attacks
In Section 5.2, we demonstrated that Boundary-ODS outperformed state-of-the-art attacks in terms
of median `2 perturbation. Here, we depict the frequency distribution of the perturbations to show
the consistency of the improvement. Figure 9 describes the cumulative frequency distribution of `2
perturbations for each attack at 10000 queries. Boundary-ODS consistently decreases `2 perturbations
compared to other attacks in both untargeted and targeted settings.
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untargeted targeted
Figure 9: Cumulative frequency distribution of `2 perturbations at 10000 queries for decision-based
attacks.
D.4 Performance of ODS against different target models
In this paper, we used pre-trained ResNet50 model as the target model for all experiments in Section 5.
Here we set pre-trained VGG19 model as the target model and run experiments to show that the
efficiency of ODS is independent with target models. As surrogate models, we replace VGG19 with
ResNet50, i.e. we use four pre-trained models (ResNet50, ResNet34, DenseNet121, MobileNetV2).
We run experiments for SimBA-ODS in Section 5.1 and Boundary-ODS in Section 5.2. All settings
except the target model and surrogate models are the same as the previous experiments. In Table 10
and 11, ODS significantly improves attacks against VGG19 model for both SimBA and Boundary
Attack. This indicates that the efficiency of ODS does not depend on target models.
Table 10: Query counts and `2 perturbations for score-based Simple Black-box Attacks (SimBA)
against pre-trained VGG19 model on ImageNet.
untargeted targeted
success average median `2 success average median `2
attack rate query distance rate query distance
SimBA-DCT [18] 100.0% 618 2.85 100.0% 4090 6.81
SimBA-ODS 100.0% 175 1.35 99.7% 1778 3.31
Table 11: Median `2 perturbations for decision-based Boundary Attacks against pre-trained VGG19
model on ImageNet.
number of queries
untargeted targeted
attack 1000 5000 10000 1000 5000 10000
Boundary[17] 45.62 11.79 4.19 75.10 41.63 27.34
Boundary-ODS 6.03 0.69 0.43 24.11 5.44 2.97
D.5 Effect of the choice of surrogate models
In Section 5.1 and 5.2, we used four pre-trained models as surrogate models. To investigate the effect
of the choice of surrogate models, we run attacks with seven different sets of surrogate models. All
settings except surrogate models are the same as the previous experiments.
Table 12 and 13 shows results for SimBA-ODS and Boundary-ODS, respectively. First, the first four
rows in both tables are results for a single surrogate model. The degree of improvements depends on
the model. ResNet34 gives the largest improvement and VGG19 gives the smallest improvement.
Next, the fifth and sixth rows show results for sets of two surrogate models. By combining surrogate
models, the query efficiency improves, especially for targeted attacks. This means that the diversity
from multiple surrogate models is basically useful to make attacks strong. Finally, the performances
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in the seventh row are results for four surrogate models, which are not always better than results
for the combination of two models (ResNet34 and DenseNet121). When the performances for each
surrogate model are widely different, the combination of those surrogate models could be harmful.
Table 12: Query counts and `2 perturbations for SimBA-ODS attacks with various sets of sur-
rogate models. In the column of surrogate models, R:ResNet34, D:DenseNet121, V:VGG19,
M:MobileNetV2.
untargeted targeted
surrogate success median median `2 success median median `2
models num. rate query distance rate query distance
R 1 100.0% 274 1.35 95.3% 5115 3.50
D 1 100.0% 342 1.38 96.7% 5282 3.51
V 1 100.0% 660 1.78 88.0% 9769 4.80
M 1 100.0% 475 1.70 95.3% 6539 4.53
R,D 2 100.0% 223 1.31 98.0% 3381 3.39
V,M 2 100.0% 374 1.60 96.3% 4696 4.27
R,V,D,M 4 100.0% 241 1.40 98.3% 3502 3.55
Table 13: Median `2 perturbations for Boundary-ODS attacks with various sets of surrogate models.
In the column of surrogate models, R:ResNet34, D:DenseNet121, V:VGG19, M:MobileNetV2.
number of queries
surrogate untargeted targeted
models num. 1000 5000 10000 1000 5000 10000
R 1 9.90 1.41 0.79 31.32 11.49 7.89
D 1 10.12 1.39 0.76 32.63 11.30 7.44
V 1 22.68 3.47 1.52 49.18 24.26 17.75
M 1 20.67 2.34 1.10 44.90 18.62 12.01
R,D 2 7.53 1.07 0.61 26.00 8.08 6.22
V,M 2 17.60 1.70 0.92 39.63 14.97 9.21
R,V,D,M 4 7.57 0.98 0.57 27.24 6.84 3.76
D.6 Effect of the number of surrogate models for the experiment in Section 5.3
We described that surrogate models with limited out-of-distribution training dataset are still useful
for ODS in Section 5.3. In the experiment, we used five surrogate models with the same ResNet18
architecture. Here, we reveal the importance of the number of surrogate models through experiments
with the different number of models. Table 14 shows the result for Boundary-ODS with the different
number of surrogate models. With the increase of the number of models, the query efficiency
consistently improves.
Table 14: Median `2 perturbations for Boundary-ODS attacks with different number of surrogate
models against out-of-distribution images on ImageNet.
number of queries
num. of untargeted targeted
models 1000 5000 10000 1000 5000 10000
1 19.45 2.90 1.66 47.86 25.30 20.46
2 15.45 2.42 1.35 43.45 19.30 13.78
3 13.75 1.96 1.14 41.63 16.91 11.14
4 14.23 1.86 1.21 41.65 14.86 9.64
5 11.27 1.63 0.98 41.67 13.72 8.39
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D.7 Score-based attacks with ODS against out-of-distribution images
In Section 5.3, we demonstrated that the decision-based Boundary-ODS attack works well even if
we only have surrogate models trained with limited out-of-distribution dataset. Here, we evaluate
score-based SimBA-ODS with these surrogate models. Except surrogate models, we adopt the same
setting as Section 5.1.
In Table 15, SimBA-ODS with out-of-distribution dataset outperforms SimBA-DCT in untargeted
settings. In targeted settings, while SimBA-ODS improves the `2 perturbation, the average queries for
SimBA-ODS are comparable with SimBA-DCT. We hypothesize that it is because ODS only explores
the subspace of the input space. The restriction to the subspace may lead to bad local optima. We can
mitigate this local optima problem by applying random sampling temporally when SimBA-ODS fails
to update a target image in many steps in a low.
We note that decision-based Boundary-ODS with OOD dataset is effective, as shown in Section 5.3.
We hypothesize that the difference in effectiveness is because Boundary-ODS does not use scores of
the target model and thus does not trap in local optima.
Table 15: Query counts and `2 perturbations for SimBA-ODS attacks with surrogate models trained
with OOD images on ImageNet.
untargeted targeted
success average median `2 success median average `2
attack rate queries perturbation rate queries perturbation
SimBA-DCT [18] 100.0% 908 2.95 97.0% 7113 7.00
SimBA-ODS (OOD dataset) 100.0% 490 1.94 94.7% 6924 4.92
SimBA-ODS (full dataset) 100.0% 241 1.40 98.3% 3502 3.55
E Relationship and Comparison between ODS and MultiTargeted
In this section, we describe that ODS gives better diversity than the MultiTargeted attack [16] for
initialization and sampling.
MultiTargeted is a variant of white-box PGD attacks, which maximizes ft(x)− fy(x) where f(x)
is logits, y is the original label and t is a target label. The target label is changed per restarts. In
other words, MultiTargeted moves a target image to a particular direction in the output space, which
is represented as like wd = (1, 0,−1, 0) where 1 and -1 correspond to the target and original label,
respectively. Namely, the procedure of MultiTargeted is technically similar to ODS.
However, there are some key differences between MultiTargeted and ODS. One of the difference is
the motivation. MultiTargeted was proposed as a white-box attack and the study only focused on
`p-bounded white-box attacks. On the other hand, our study gives broader application for white- and
black-box attacks. As far as we know, ODS is the first method which exploits the output diversity for
initialization and sampling.
Another key difference is the necessity of the original label of target images. ODS does not use
the information about the original label, and thus ODS is applicable for black-box attacks even
if surrogate models are trained with out-of-distribution training dataset, as shown in Section 5.3.
On the other hand, since MultiTargeted exploits the original label of target images to calculate the
direction of the attack, we cannot apply MultiTargeted to sampling for black-box attacks against
out-of-distribution images.
Finally, the level of diversity is also different. As we mentioned in Section 6, the direction of
MultiTargeted is restricted to away from the original class. This restriction could be harmful
for diversity because the subspace to explore directions is limited. To show this statement, we
apply MultiTargeted to initialization for white-box attacks and sampling for black-box attacks, and
demonstrate that ODI provides better diversity than MultiTargeted for initialization and sampling
(especially for sampling).
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Initialization in white-box settings We apply MultiTargeted to initalization for white-box attacks
in Section 4.1. Table 16 represents the comparison of the attack performance with initialization by
MultiTargeted and ODI. For PGD attacks, MultiTargeted is slightly better than ODI. We hypotheses
that it is because MultiTargeted was developed as a variant of PGD attacks and the initialization by
MultiTargeted also works as an attack method. On the other hand, ODI outperforms MultiTargeted
for C&W attacks. In this setting, MultiTargeted does not work as an attack method, and thus the
difference in the diversity makes the difference in the performance.
Table 16: Comparison of model performance under attacks with MultiTargeted (MT) and ODI. The
values are model accuracy (lower is better) for PGD and the average of the minimum `2 perturbations
(lower is better) for C&W. All results are the average of three trials.
PGD C&W
model MT ODI MT ODI
MNIST 89.94± 0.07% 90.12± 0.04% 2.26± 0.01 2.25± 0.01
CIFAR-10 44.33± 0.01% 44.35± 0.03% 0.69± 0.01 0.67± 0.00
ImageNet 42.2± 0.0% 42.3± 0.0% 2.30± 0.01 1.32± 0.01
Sampling in black-box settings We use MultiTargeted for sampling on the Boundary Attack in
Section 5.2 (called Boundary-MT), and compare it with Boundary-ODS. Table 17 and Figure 10
show the results of the comparison. While Boundary-MT outperforms the original Boundary Attack,
Boundary-ODS finds much smaller adversarial perturbation than Boundary-MT.
In Figure 10, Boundary-MT slightly outperforms Boundary-ODS at small queries. We hypotheses
that it is because MultiTargeted not works for providing diversity, but works for the approximation of
gradients of the loss function. However, with the number of queries, the curve of Boundary-MT is
saturated, and Boundary-MT underperforms Boundary-ODS. This is an evidence that the restriction
of directions is harmful for sampling.
Table 17: Median `2 perturbations for Boundary Attack with ODS and MultiTargeted (MT).
number of queries
untargeted targeted
attack 1000 5000 10000 1000 5000 10000
Boundary [17] 45.07 11.46 4.30 73.94 41.88 27.05
Boundary-ODS 7.57 0.98 0.57 27.24 6.84 3.76
Boundary-MT 7.65 2.20 2.01 28.16 18.48 16.59
Untargeted Targeted
Figure 10: Relationship between median `2 perturbations and the number of queries for Boundary
Attack with ODS and MultiTargeted. Error bars show 25%ile and 75%ile of `2 perturbations.
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